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SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO
†
: 
BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH INTERVENTIONS IN MODERN 
VACCINATION POLICY 
PHOEBE E. ARDE-ACQUAH

 
ABSTRACT 
Vaccine policy still stirs up similar contentions and controversial 
sentiments today as it did in 1905 due to the enduring tension between 
public health interventions and individual liberties, between the rights of 
the individual and the claims of the collective. This Note considers the 
rationale for granting vaccine exemptions in one case, but withholding 
them in another; why one court gives substantial deference to state power 
regarding vaccination, and another demonstrates considerable regard for 
civil liberties in vaccine policy.  
It has been suggested that pragmatism and political acuity, rather than 
a doctrinal adherence to epidemiological theory or ethical principles has 
guided vaccine policy into achieving its current level of success. This Note 
considers that in order to maintain and improve on this level of success, 
the crucial issues of advancements in scientific and medical knowledge, 
changes in the role of government institutions, and evolving constitutional 
law jurisprudence must inform vaccine policymaking to effectively 
safeguard the public’s health while simultaneously preserving the sanctity 
of individual rights. 
 
 
 †  MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE LEGIBUS bk. III, part III, sub. VIII, at 241 (J.G.F. Powell ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (c. 43 B.C.E.) (Latin for “The health [‘good’ or ‘welfare’] of the people is 
the supreme law.”). 
 
 J.D. Candidate (2015), Washington University School of Law; M.P.H. (2010), Columbia 
University; B.A. (2007), Bryn Mawr College. I thank my family and loved ones for their constant love, 
support and encouragement. I also thank the Jurisprudence Review editorial staff, particularly 
Nicholas De Rosa and Carolyn Goldberg, for their insightful editorial work and patience in ensuring 
the quality of this Note. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“It is revolting to say the least,” the letter began, “to think I must have 
diseased animal matter injected into the blood of my child before he can 
receive an education.”1 Charles Hoppe’s letter to New York City’s Health 
Commissioner pleaded for an exemption to the smallpox vaccine mandate 
to be made for Hoppe’s eight-year old son. Having already endured the 
tragic loss of another son to a diphtheria immunization, Hoppe held strong 
philosophical objections to vaccination. The Commissioner, on the other 
hand, strongly supported vaccination, but was also very conscious of the 
presence of a local anti-vaccination society bent on repealing the New 
York law mandating vaccination for children of school-going age. She 
granted Hoppe a special certificate of admission exempting his son from 
the legally required protection.
2
  
Almost two decades prior to Hoppe’s letter, Henning Jacobson and his 
son refused to comply with the Cambridge Board of Health’s statutory 
mandate of the smallpox vaccine
3
 based on past adverse reactions to 
earlier vaccinations.
4
 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court imposed 
the statutory fine of $5 on Jacobson, and he appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. He argued that “a compulsory vaccination law is 
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the 
inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such 
way as to him seems best.”5 The Court upheld the state’s authority through 
its general police powers to broadly regulate in the interest of the public’s 
health, stating that Massachusetts had not overstepped its authority into the 
sphere of personal liberties protected by the Constitution, including the 
right to refuse vaccination.
6
 
 
 
 1. JAMES COLGROVE, STATE OF IMMUNITY: THE POLITICS OF VACCINATION IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 1 (2006) (quoting Letter from Charles Hoppe to Shirley Wynne (Jan. 23, 1931) 
(on file with the NYCDOH, box 141375, folder: Vaccination). The smallpox vaccination was required 
of all school children for school attendance and Hoppe’s son could not attend public school without it.  
 2. Id. (quoting Letter from Shirley Wynne to Charles Hoppe (Jan. 29, 1931) (on file with 
NYCDOH, box 141375, folder: Vaccination). 
 3. The statute at issue reads: “Boards of health, if in their opinion it is necessary for public 
health or safety, shall require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants of 
their towns, and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever refuses or neglects to 
comply with such requirement shall forfeit five dollars.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 181 (2010). 
 4. Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s 
Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 582 (2005). 
 5. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).  
 6. See id. The Court cautioned that state laws were broadly within the discretion of the state as 
long as they did not “contravene the Constitution of the United States or infringe any right granted or 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/8
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Eighty-three years after Hoppe and more than a century after Jacobson, 
vaccine policy still stirs up similar contentions and controversial 
sentiments today. James Colgrove, an outspoken critic of the tenuous 
balance between public health interventions and individual liberties, 
rightly states, “One of the most fundamental and enduring tensions in . . . 
public health is the balance between the rights of the individual and the 
claims of the collective, and nowhere is this dynamic more salient than in 
policies and practices surrounding immunization.”7 
This Note considers the rationale for granting vaccine exemptions in 
one case, but withholding them in another; why one court gives substantial 
deference to state power regarding vaccination, and another demonstrates 
considerable regard for civil liberties in vaccine policy. Colgrove suggests 
that “pragmatism and political acuity, rather than doctrinaire adherence to 
epidemiological theory or ethical principles,”8 as demonstrated in the 
Hoppe case, has guided vaccine policy into achieving its current level of 
success.  
In order to maintain this level of success, advancements in scientific 
and medical knowledge, changes in the role of government institutions, 
and evolving constitutional law jurisprudence are three crucial issues that 
must inform vaccine policymaking to effectively safeguard the public’s 
health while simultaneously preserving the sanctity of individual rights. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE DUTY TO SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH  
A. Definition and Source of the Duty 
Public health has been broadly defined to include the health and safety 
of a community, society, or population of people. The World Health 
Organization defines public health as “all organized measures (whether 
public or private) to prevent disease, promote health, and prolong life 
among the population as a whole.”9 According to the American Public 
Health Association (APHA), public health is “the practice of preventing 
disease and promoting good health within groups of people, from small 
communities to entire countries.”10 A landmark report issued by the 
 
 
secured by that instrument.” Id. at 25. 
 7. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 2.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Glossary of Globalization, Trade, and Health Terms, Public Health, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story076/en/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).  
 10. What is Public Health? Our Commitment to Safe, Healthy Communities, AMERICAN PUBLIC 
HEALTH ASSOCIATION, http://www.apha.org/~/media/files/pdf/fact%20sheets/whatisph.ashx (last visited 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Institute of Medicine (IOM) further defines public health as “what we, as a 
society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be 
healthy.”11 The responsibility for preserving the public’s health is inherent 
in each of these definitions as one for “public or private” entities, as well 
as for “we, as a society.” The practical reality of modern societies, 
however, delegates the powers and duty of safeguarding the general well-
being of the public to the government. 
In the United States, the duty to protect and promote the general 
welfare and health of the people within constitutional boundaries has 
historically been the purview of state and local government public health 
agencies.
12
 Lawrence Gostin outlines government’s long tradition of 
regulating for the community’s welfare by regulating individuals, 
professionals, institutions, and businesses through the use of its broad 
powers.
13
 States’ jurisdiction and authority to enact laws to safeguard the 
public’s health has its source in federalism, the distribution or allocation of 
governmental power between federal and state governments, inherent in 
the United States Constitution. The Tenth Amendment specifically gives 
states general ‘police powers’ to secure and preserve the public’s health 
and safety, among other local state concerns.
14
 The power to secure the 
general welfare of the people, arguably not one delegated to the federal 
government, was reserved to the states as sovereign governments. State 
constitutions, in turn, delegate this authority to local government and local 
public health departments to carry out this mandate. Courts have affirmed 
this jurisdiction and explicitly recognized that “the police power of a state 
 
 
Mar. 19, 2015). 
 11. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1988).  
 12. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 191–92 (Thomas A. Green & Hendrik Hartog eds., 1996).  
 13. See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 99–166 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., rev. and 
updated 2d ed. 2010) (Dedicating two chapters to discussing government’s duty to protect the public’s 
health and safety, government’s power to regulate in the name of public health, and the limits and 
restraints existing on the exercise of these public health powers as three issues central to understanding 
the role of public health authorities in the constitutional design.). 
 14. The Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s dicta defined state police powers as “that immense mass of legislation, which embraces 
every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can be 
most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws 
of every description, . . . are component parts of this mass.”). See also Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–25 
(1905) (“The authority of the State to enact this statute is to be referred to what is commonly called the 
police power—a power which the State did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union 
under the Constitution.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/8
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must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations . . . as will 
protect the public health and the public safety.”15 More specifically, the 
police power allocates to a state “the authority . . . to enact . . . ‘health laws 
of every description’”16 and to broadly regulate in the interest of the 
public.  
Consequently, the early history of public health saw states and local 
municipal entities at the frontlines of protecting the public welfare, safety, 
and health of their communities. This broad mandate covered regulation of 
infectious or communicable diseases and unsanitary conditions.
17
 In 1902, 
Massachusetts became the first state to exercise its police powers to grant 
its local city Board of Health the authority to “require and enforce the 
vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants of their towns . . .” if 
“in their opinion, it [was] necessary for public health or safety.”18 
More recently, the federal government has moved to the frontlines in 
carrying out the mandate to safeguard the public’s health principally due 
to the increasing scope of the national economy. Federal regulatory 
jurisdiction has its source in the Commerce Clause—Congressional power 
to regulate commodities (including food and drugs) passing through 
interstate commerce
19—as well as, but less so, from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to provide for the “general welfare” of the people.20 These 
powers, in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause, are typically employed 
in justification of instances of federal intervention in national-level 
epidemics and public health emergencies.
21
 The recognition of a need for 
federal leadership to set national public health policies and standards led to 
the creation of federal public health programs and administrative agencies 
such as the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and subsequently the Centers for Disease Control 
 
 
 15. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.  
 16. Id.  
 17. See GOSTIN, supra note 13.  
 18. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 181 (2010).  
 19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Public Health Service Act gives the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services authority to make and enforce regulations to “prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or 
possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.” 42 U.S.C. § 264(a). 
 20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 21. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI of the United States Constitution makes federal law 
the supreme law of the land and resolves conflicts of law between state and federal law in favor of 
federal law. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and Prevention (CDC) and the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP).
22
  
This increasing preemptory role of the federal government in public 
health regulation forms a crucial component of the contentious debate over 
public heath interventions and the sanctity of individual rights. Public 
health federalism is a recurring issue in this debate and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence shows a trend towards “resuscitation” of states’ police 
powers in opposition to federal public health regulation.
23
 While the Court 
may be arguably on the states’ side in the federalism battle,24 states have 
galvanized their own ‘battle weapons’—primarily, the state legislature—to 
effectively fight federal public health interventions to which their 
constituents are opposed.  
The definition and source of the duty to protect the public’s health are 
entwined with the historical and scientific reasons for initial vaccination 
efforts. In addition to providing insight into the definition and source of 
the duty, public health history also explains the scientific and 
chronological reasons behind the duty to vaccinate.  
B. Historical and Scientific Reasons for the Public Health Duty to 
Vaccinate 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, infectious disease epidemics 
such as smallpox, influenza, poliomyelitis, diphtheria, and tuberculosis 
killed populations by the million. Previous methods of inoculation had low 
levels of preventive success and occasionally produced full-blown cases of 
the disease, inadvertently spreading rather than preventing it.
25
  
 
 
 22. See generally KENNETH R. WING & BENJAMIN GILBERT, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S 
HEALTH 181–213 (7th ed. 2006). The CDC and the ACIP approve and recommend immunizations, 
which are almost always followed or adopted by states in state statutes and municipal regulations.  
 23. GOSTIN, supra note 13, at 100. The battle over mandatory vaccination laws is one arena in 
which public health federalism has played out most prominently. My examination, in ‘The Vaccination 
Debate’ section, (see infra Part III) of the Hepatitis B and human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine 
mandates shows how state legislatures, quite apart from the courts’ help, can effectively block federal 
attempts at public health regulation.  
 24. Gostin does not see the Court’s rulings as exclusively favoring states’ rights. The Court 
allows federal preemption of state laws in some cases, which hinders state regulation, and asserts 
states’ reserved powers in other cases, which hinders federal public health regulation, essentially 
making public health governance almost impossible. Id. Court rulings allowing federal laws to 
preempt state laws include Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (state tort 
law), Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (tobacco regulation), and Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiff’s Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (drug and medical devices).  
 25. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/8
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The scientific foundation for vaccination rests on the concept of ‘herd 
immunity’ for the protection of an entire population or community from 
contagion. Vaccine efficiency and effectiveness is dependent on a 
sufficiently large or significant percentage (typically eighty to ninety-five 
percent) of the group being immunized. In this way, the whole community 
will be strong enough to ward off infection from those persons who are 
either unvaccinated or for whom the vaccine is ineffective.
26
 The 
effectiveness of vaccines in prolonging life and controlling epidemics of 
infectious diseases in the twentieth century led to vaccination quickly 
replacing inoculation as the method of choice. 
Vaccination was introduced into the United States in 1801
27
 based on 
scientific research demonstrating its effectiveness, and medical and 
scientific journals touting its efficacy in areas where it was widely 
practiced as opposed to where it was not.
28
 Massachusetts enacted the first 
vaccination law for smallpox in 1809.
29
 In 1827, Boston spearheaded 
mandatory vaccination in becoming the first city to mandate smallpox 
vaccination as a condition for school attendance. Many states followed suit 
in enacting mandatory smallpox vaccination laws.
30
 For two centuries 
following this formative era, “vaccines . . . protected communities from 
diseases that in previous eras were responsible for the majority of the 
world’s illness and death.”31  
The year 1957 marked the next landmark in vaccination with Jonas 
Salk’s polio vaccine. This proved to be a huge success for what was then 
the most terrifying childhood disease and the gravest public health threat 
post-World War Two. Its discovery became “a media sensation and 
marked the first time that meeting public demand for a vaccination was a 
greater challenge than persuading the reluctant.”32 
Following the eradication of smallpox and the near elimination of 
polio, vaccination was well on its way to becoming part of public health 
 
 
 26. See Paul E. M. Fine, Herd Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15 EPID. REVS. 265, 267 
(1993).  
 27. This was in the case of smallpox where Edward Jenner’s 1796 breakthrough vaccine replaced 
inoculation as the original method of treatment. Jenner’s method was safer and sparked the advent of 
compulsory vaccination laws in light of this increased safety. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 6. 
 28. Id. at 7. 
 29. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 386 n.27 (2000) 
(citing Charles L. Jackson, State Laws on Compulsory Immunization in the United States, 84 PUB. 
HEALTH REP. 787, 792–94 (1969)). 
 30. Gail Javitt, Deena Berkowitz & Lawrence O. Gostin, Assessing Mandatory HPV 
Vaccination: Who Should Call the Shots?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 384, 388 (2008). 
 31. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 32. Id. at 15.  
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efforts and policy. States and federal agencies began to step up efforts to 
increase vaccination levels for childhood and adulthood diseases that still 
threatened the United States.
33
 By necessity, these efforts raised the 
specter of legal constraints that should and could be applied to ensure 
federal and state efforts at achieving high vaccination levels did not 
overstep the boundaries of constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties.  
C. Legal Precedent and Policy Developments of the Duty to Vaccinate  
The duty and powers of government to safeguard the public’s health 
are not without legal boundaries. Federal and local public health agencies 
act within the boundaries of the Constitution and “within the scope of 
legislative mandates.”34 As governments exercised their powers to regulate 
for public health reasons and disputes arose concerning the lawfulness of 
specific interventions, courts often had to step in to interpret these 
boundaries.  
The efficacy of vaccination prompted laws and policies at the state 
level to compel this practice. This section presents an overview of 
vaccination laws and policy from the beginning of the twentieth century 
until the current vaccine policy of the twenty-first century. While states 
played a dominant role in the public health vaccination terrain in the early 
twentieth century, this role began to lessen in the 1950s when the federal 
government, through agencies, assumed a tentative but more substantial 
role in vaccination.
35
 
In response to the phenomenon of “free riding”—where certain 
individuals refused to be vaccinated but sought to benefit from ‘herd 
immunity’ through others’ vaccinations—various states enacted 
mandatory vaccination statutes and regulations. For example, in 1827, 
Boston required vaccination for school attendance, and in 1855, 
Massachusetts became the first state to require childhood vaccination laws 
 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. GOSTIN, supra note 13, at 99, 135–65 (providing an excellent overview of constitutional 
restraints on state and federal governments’ exercise of public health power). Early twentieth-century 
constitutional limitations included public health necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and 
harm avoidance, see Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 11; and nondiscriminatory enforcement of public health 
laws, see Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900). Modern restraints were, first, 
substantive and required a plausible explanation for government intrusion on personal rights or 
liberties, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and second, 
procedural, requiring a fair hearing before depriving individuals of liberty or property interests, see 
Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1980). 
 35. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/8
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for school attendance. Those who refused to be vaccinated were subject to 
a monetary fine by the City.  
In 1902, the Massachusetts City Board of Health passed the statute at 
issue in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The case of Henning Jacobson, 
establishing the duty and right of states to set mandatory vaccine policy 
under their general police powers, became one of the most prominent 
cases in U.S. vaccine jurisprudence.
36
 Jacobson asserted a Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process claim against the Massachusetts statute’s 
mandatory requirement of vaccination for persons over the age of twenty-
one. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state’s 
compulsory vaccination laws [for smallpox] as “necessary for the public 
health or the public safety.”37 The Court stated that “the police power of a 
state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations . . . as 
will protect the public health and the public safety.”38 
In Adams v. Milwaukee, eight years after Jacobson, the Supreme Court 
sustained the validity of a health ordinance of the common council of the 
City of Milwaukee regulating the sale of impure milk as reasonable and 
proper and “necessary for the protection of the public health.”39 In 
recognizing that the state’s police power extends to protecting its people 
against the sale of impure food such as milk, Justice McKenna affirmed 
Jacobson’s holding that states may delegate the power to order 
vaccinations to local municipalities for the enforcement of public health 
regulations.
40
 Subsequently, in 1922, the Court reviewed a similar 
situation in Zucht v. King involving a city ordinance mandating smallpox 
vaccination for school children and held that the Equal Protection Clause 
was not violated when school vaccination laws mandated vaccination only 
among children.
41
 The Court rejected the notion that the vaccination laws 
were discriminatory
42
 and summarily issued a terse three-paragraph 
 
 
  36. See James Colgrove & Ronald Bayer, Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public Health, and the 
Legacy of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 571, 571 (2005) (referring to Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts as “one of the most important pieces of public health jurisprudence” and “precedent 
in numerous cases that have challenged vaccination laws.”).  
 37. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.  
 38. Id. at 25. The 7–2 opinion was a strong endorsement and recognition of the broad and 
flexible powers of the state to carry out their mandate of “secur[ing] the general comfort, health and 
prosperity of the State.” Id. at 26. The Court further held that such exercise of the state’s power was 
within the full discretion of the state and the federal powers and judicial review only comes in to 
ensure that this exercise does not “contravene the Constitution of the United States or infringe any 
right granted or secured by that instrument.” Id. at 25.  
 39. Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 583 (1913). 
 40. Id.; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39. 
 41. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922). 
 42. Id. 
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opinion reaffirming its previous positions in Jacobson and Adams, that 
states can grant cities broad discretion to decide when to impose health 
regulations.
43
 The Court reiterated and reaffirmed principles from Adams 
that the city ordinance at issue in Zucht did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Protection rights. 
This broad interpretation of the duty of the state continued to be upheld 
even in the face of religious freedoms. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court again followed legal precedent in holding that parents’ 
religious freedoms are subjugated and secondary to the state’s interest in 
protecting the health of the public and individual children.
44
 In language 
strikingly reminiscent of Jacobson, the Court held that, “neither rights of 
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation” and that, “the 
right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the 
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health 
or death.”45  
In 1964, the U.S. Surgeon General established the ACIP to set 
recommendations for vaccination against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, 
typhoid fever, as well as publicized vaccine side effects, adverse reactions, 
contraindications and precautions for diseases like measles, Hepatitis B, 
poliomyelitis, and mumps.
46
 In the face of emerging infectious diseases 
such as HPV, HIV/AIDS, and H1N1 that came with the twenty-first 
century, the choice of mandates was left for the most part to state 
legislatures. Vaccine mandates were presumed constitutional under 
Jacobson, even for non-airborne diseases for which other recourse exists 
to protect an individual.
47
  
Currently, all states provide vaccine law exemptions where the vaccine 
would threaten the child’s health. All but two states allow for religious 
exemptions. Less than half of fifty states allow for exemptions on moral or 
other grounds. States with mandatory school vaccination policies have 
 
 
 43. Id.; see also Adams, 228 U.S. at 583. 
 44. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Prince involved argument on the part of a 
mother that a child labor law restricting her ability to allow her child to sell religious materials on the 
street was a violation of her First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.  
 45. Id. at 166–67. 
 46. See Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/ACIP/ index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). Congress 
established the ACIP to advise the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the CDC 
recommends vaccination policy to the states based on this advice. Note, Toward a Twenty-First-
Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1828–29 (2008).  
 47. Note, supra note 46, at 1831 (While “[t]he application of state police power to non-airborne 
diseases, like hepatitis B, appears to have troubled judges . . . courts [were not] prepared to reexamine 
Jacobson and ask whether the century-old precedent applies.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/8
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broad opt-out provisions such as with Virginia’s mandate in 2008 for 
Merck’s HPV vaccine, Gardasil. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Act was also enacted in 1986 to provide compensation for 
injuries arising from immunizations under the National Vaccine Injury 
Program.
48
 At present, childhood vaccination or immunization laws for 
school attendance are governed by state law, but states overwhelmingly 
adopt the CDC’s list of vaccinations recommended by the ACIP.49  
The subsequent section addressing the vaccination debate demonstrates 
how a change in legal and jurisprudential leanings by the Supreme Court 
and other higher courts have resulted in a shift in case law. There has been 
a marked swing of the pendulum from extreme deference to state police 
powers to a more cautious approach toward granting states unlimited 
power to compel vaccination. The jurisprudential theories underlying this 
shift—social contract theory, utilitarianism and libertarianism—and their 
application in the context of vaccination and vaccine policy are discussed 
and explored in the next section.  
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS UNDERLYING VACCINATION AS A 
PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTION 
David Fidler avers, “[p]rotecting public health has always required law, 
particularly the use of law to empower and limit governmental actors 
responsible for responding to disease threats.”50 Consistent with Fidler’s 
asseration, the main legal framework that allocates jurisdiction of public 
health powers required to carry out public health interventions among 
national and sub-national levels of government has been constitutional 
law. Practically, though, social contract theory informs and governs public 
health interventions.  
A. Social Contract Theory 
According to 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, in deciding to 
live in a commonwealth, human beings consent to abdicate their natural 
rights and liberties to the absolute authority of a government in exchange 
for security. They agree to cede some of their rights if others also cede 
 
 
 48. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (1986). 
 49. Note, supra note 46, at 1829 (citing KURT LINK, THE VACCINE CONTROVERSY: THE 
HISTORY, USE, AND SAFETY OF VACCINATIONS 170–71 (2005)). 
 50. David P. Fidler, Global Health Jurisprudence: A Time of Reckoning, 96 GEO. L.J. 393, 396 
(2008).  
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some of their rights.
51
 Thus “government requires the consent of its 
citizens, manifested in a social contract.”52 Commentators have noted that 
“[t]he term police power is not to be found within the Hobbesian corpus, 
yet his notion of sovereignty coincides with the doctrine as it was 
established.”53 Sir William Blackstone further draws on Hobbes’ doctrine 
of the original social contract to create the idea as a distinct power of the 
state.
54
 The underlying principles of vaccination bear out this theory in the 
sense that that individuals consent to give up their right to be free from 
disease and disease-causing organisms, in subjecting themselves to 
vaccination, on the condition that others in society also cede a similar 
natural right, for the protection of the whole commonwealth from disease. 
The police power of the state ensures that this mutual ceding of natural 
rights has the security and welfare of the whole as the social contract goal.  
This police power referenced by Blackstone and undergirded by 
Hobbes’ social contract theory “at the very least . . . is understood to 
include legislation made in the interest of public morals, health, and 
safety.”55 The Jacobson opinion seems to closely track Hobbes’ theory: 
“[I]n every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the 
safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty 
may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such 
restraint . . . as the safety of the general public may demand.”56 
Commentators like Thomas Pope support Justice Harlan’s interpretation of 
Hobbes that “the existence of civil society presupposes certain duties on 
the part of the state, foremost of which are the safety and well-being of its 
citizens.”57 Thus, the right of the individual to refuse vaccination and to be 
free from disease-causing organisms comes “under pressure of the great 
[danger]” of contagion, to quote Justice Harlan, and subjects the individual 
to a restraint on his exercise of this right. Pope asserts that “Hobbes 
intend[ed] his work to balance the competing interests of liberty and 
 
 
 51. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109–45 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil 
Blackwell 1946) (1651). Sir William Blackstone’s representation of this tradeoff has been depicted as 
“The sovereign performs his duty because from it he derives his power. In turn, the subject performs 
his duty because he wishes to enjoy the riches of civil society.” THOMAS R. POPE, SOCIAL CONTRACT 
THEORY IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: TOO MUCH LIBERTY AND TOO MUCH AUTHORITY 51–52 
(2013).  
 52. POPE, supra note 51, at 8. 
 53. Id. at 7. 
 54. Id. at 50–52. 
 55. Id. at 51 & 104 n.3 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 661 (1887); Crowley v. Christensen, 
137 U.S. 89 (1890); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 11; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 391 (1937)). 
 56. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29. 
 57. POPE, supra note 51, at 7. 
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authority” and cites Jacobson as a clear example of legitimate government 
intrusion.
58
 
English philosopher John Locke postulates a similar social contract 
theory in the formation of political communities “as a way of preserving 
individual natural rights, most notably the individual’s interest in property 
and in life.”59 According to Locke, health is the equal right of all persons 
no less than liberty and property. He states regarding these rights, “The 
state of nature has a law of nature to govern it [ . . . ] and reason, which is 
that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal 
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, 
or possessions.”60 Thus, in the original state of nature, man has “a title to 
perfect freedom, and uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and 
privileges of the law of nature . . . [and] a power . . . to preserve . . . his 
life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men.”61  
But man moves from a state of nature into that of a commonwealth, 
and political or civil society is formed “wherever . . . any number of men 
. . . quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and . . . 
resign[s] it to the public.”62 Locke himself stated that this commonwealth 
is “a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and 
advancing [of] their own civil interests[,] [c]ivil interest[s] I call life, 
liberty, health, and indolency of body.”63 Elsewhere, Locke affirms that 
such resignation of decisions to the public “authorizes the society . . . to 
make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require.”64 The 
state is a neutral judge to protect such “civil interests,” to quote Locke, of 
those who live in it.  
Speaking in the context of political society but equally applicable to 
vaccination as an aspect of health, Locke asks why one who is by nature 
free would give up his freedom and subject himself to the control of 
another power. The ‘obvious’ answer, he responds, is that “though in the 
 
 
 58. Id. at 8. 
 59. Kathryn N. Benson, Comment, A Procedural Approach to the Problem of the Right, 58 MO. 
L. REV. 183, 185 n.14 (1993). 
 60. Darrin W. Snyder Belousek, Health Care, Natural Law, and the American Commons: Locke 
and Libertarianism, 16 J. MKTS. & MORALITY 463, 465 (2013) (emphasis added) (quoting JOHN 
LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 
19 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., W.W. Norton 2005) (1689)). 
 61. LOCKE, supra note 60, at 53.  
 62. Id. at 55. 
 63. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN 
LOCKE, supra note 60, at 129 (emphasis added). Note again the mention of health, here, as a civil 
interest. 
 64. LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 
JOHN LOCKE, supra note 60, at 55.  
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state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very 
uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others.”65 Applied to 
health generally and the contemporary vaccine context specifically, 
Belousek asserts Locke’s understanding of natural law as “not only to 
forbid harming others but also to oblige preserving the life and health of 
others.”66 Thus each one has a natural duty not only to preserve himself 
but also, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind. The rationale 
underlying the decision by an individual to give up his right to be free 
from disease and subject himself to immunization is that the preserving 
and advancing of one’s health, and the health of mankind, is uncertain 
when one remains unvaccinated. 
Thus one is constantly susceptible or exposed to disease if this natural 
right is asserted. The result is a “willing[ness] to quit a condition, which, 
however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without 
reason, that [one] seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others . . . 
for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates . . . .”67 In 
effect, the social contract is a rational and a self-preserving choice.
68
 It is a 
rational means to an end—the benefit and preservation of all individuals 
involved.  
According to French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Every man 
by nature has a right to everything he needs.”69 However, man opts to 
become a social being by giving up his natural rights in exchange for civil 
rights, and thus the social contract is born.
70
 The social contract involves 
popular sovereignty and direct rule by the people as a whole. In this view, 
the collective rules, and the popular sovereign body is not a limitation of 
individual freedom but an expression of it.
71
 In other words, the rule by the 
 
 
 65. Id. at 72. 
 66. Belousek, supra note 60, at 467. “Everyone, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to 
quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, 
ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice to 
an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of life, the liberty, health, 
limb, or goods of another.” LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL 
WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 60, at 19 (emphasis added). 
 67. LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 
JOHN LOCKE, supra note 60, at 72. 
 68. Locke demonstrates that this choice is made by everyone only with the intention of 
preserving himself. The commonwealth and its governance is “to be directed to no other end but the 
peace, safety, and public good of the people.” Id. at 74.  
 69. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 27 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1988) (1762). 
 70. ESTHER D. REED, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTESTED DOCTRINAL AND MORAL 
ISSUES 35 (2007). 
 71. See generally ROUSSEAU, supra note 69. Rousseau’s interpretation of the social contract 
differs from those of Hobbes and Locke in that individual liberties are not alienated upon formation of 
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sovereign is in effect the rule of the people because the sovereign 
expresses the opinions and desires of the people. Rousseau described this 
contractual state as one where “[e]ach of us places his person and all his 
power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as 
one we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”72 Reed 
states that as a result, “[n]atural freedoms and potentially unlimited rights 
to life, liberty, health, and property have been relinquished in favor of 
submission to the general will.”73 
This interpretation of Rousseau brings to light the critical question 
surrounding justification of vaccination and vaccine mandates: whether the 
rule by the sovereign—be it the legislature or the courts—is a limitation of 
individual freedom as opposed to an expression of the popular freedom 
voluntarily surrendered to it by the people. The social contract, per Reed’s 
interpretation, as applied to vaccination, may be held to mean that the 
“person and all . . . power” of the people, ceded to the “supreme direction” 
of the whole, requires that decisions to mandate vaccination be an 
expression of the people’s will. Where the “people’s will” is severely 
fractured on an issue such as vaccination, there seemingly can be no one 
“general will.”  
Considered or viewed in light of the end goal—the health and well-
being of the whole—and of “each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole,” the social contract’s theory of the well-being of the collective in 
the function of the final arbiter is defensible as an expression not only of 
collective freedom but also of individual freedom.  
B. Utilitarianism 
The philosophy of utilitarianism, according to Jeremy Bentham, holds 
that “it is the greatest good to the greatest number of people which is the 
measure of right and wrong.”74 The morally right action is the one that 
results in the most good to the people. Thus Bentham and John Stuart Mill, 
classic utilitarians, postulated that the end determines whether the action is 
right.  
 
 
and entry into civil society, but he believes this contract is grounded in assent and thus consistent with 
liberty. REED, supra note 70.  
 72. ROUSSEAU, supra note 69, at 24.  
 73. REED, supra note 70. 
 74. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT 393 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) (1776).  
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For Bentham, “if a law or an action doesn’t do any good, then it isn’t 
any good.”75 If a law mandating vaccination of every individual who is 
capable of receiving the vaccine does not produce positive results in the 
interest of a great number of people, then the vaccine mandate is not good. 
Conversely, if the vaccine mandate produces positive results and prevents 
the spread of a contagion to the rest of a community, sparing the majority 
of the community infection by the disease agent, then the mandate is good. 
This is a Bentham-esque utilitarian argument in favor of vaccination.  
John Stuart Mill, a follower of Bentham and fellow advocate of this 
view, originated the opposite “harm principle” which stated, “The only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”76 
Balancing out the situation where the “right action” is determined in terms 
of the “good” done to society as a whole, the “right action” is prevention 
of imminent harm to society. Per Mill, coercion and compulsion of an 
individual is only justified where the purpose or goal is the prevention of 
harm to others. A person’s own good is not even sufficient to justify or 
warrant coercion or compulsion. The goal or sole end must be the 
prevention of harm to others. Commentators have interpreted Mill’s harm 
principle as, “If one understands a harm to be an injury to those interests 
vital for happiness, promoting ‘the permanent interests of man’ requires 
that the harm of restricting liberty through social rules can be justified 
only for reasons of preventing harm.”77  
Interestingly, Mill further asserts “the only part of the conduct of any 
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In 
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.”78 Mill’s assertion is inherently contradictory, for instances 
where the conduct of a person concerns himself and where they concern 
society are not mutually exclusive. This is particularly clear in the context 
of vaccination. If an individual’s decision to be vaccinated or not to be 
vaccinated “merely” concerns himself and his independence, then 
according to Mill, he is sovereign. At the same time, due to the mechanics 
 
 
 75. Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
Summer 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2015). 
 76. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Hackett Publishing 1978) (1859). 
 77. Robert W. Hoag, Happiness and Freedom: Recent Work on John Stuart Mill, 15 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 188, 198 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 78. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (Oxford University Press 1994) (1859). 
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of epidemics and infectious diseases, this independent decision concerns 
others and the society as a whole. 
The mechanics of vaccination depend on the actions of one affecting 
the lives of many. Thus, the failure of an individual to be vaccinated, and 
subsequently contracting a disease, puts the rest of society at a risk for 
spread of the disease. If vaccine policy were to operate along the lines of 
Mill’s theory of utilitarianism, controlling and coercing (i.e., regulating) 
only those actions of individuals for which they are amenable to society, 
vaccine policy will be inconsistent, self-contradictory, and ineffective. The 
blurred lines between individual actions that concern only individuals 
themselves and those that concern society results in the often seen tension 
between individual freedoms and the “good” of the community.  
C. Libertarianism  
Libertarianism and associated concepts of autonomy, privacy, and 
individual choice highlight the sanctity of personal liberties as well as 
constitutional protection of the same. Often these concepts are at variance 
with the principles underwriting vaccination and vaccine policy.  
A libertarian tone strongly undergirded Jacobson’s 1902 argument and 
appeal to the Supreme Court with an emphasis on bodily integrity, 
personal autonomy, and self-determination. He stated, “a compulsory 
vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and, therefore, 
hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and 
health in such way as to him seems best; and that the execution of such a 
law against one who objects to vaccination, no matter for what reason, is 
nothing short of an assault upon his person.”79  
Justice Harlan alluded to the existence of libertarianism by stating, 
“There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the 
supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any 
human government . . . to interfere with the exercise of that will.”80 
Applying the concept of libertarianism to the context of vaccination would 
result in “free riders” who benefit from herd immunity without personally 
having to undergo immunization, based on their “inherent right” as “free 
men” to take care of their bodies as they see fit.  
Colgrove acknowledged that “‘an individual’s ideal strategy would be 
to encourage everyone else to be vaccinated, [except] himself or herself 
 
 
 79. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
 80. Id. at 29.  
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(or his or her child).’”81 The logical conclusion of this strategic thinking 
results in an unfortunate “tragedy-of-the-commons” situation where each 
person acts in their own interests, placing self-interest above the common 
or collective interest, to the detriment of the community.
82
 Harlan himself 
did not hesitate to counteract Jacobson’s libertarian argument with a 
practical note that “the liberty secured by the Constitution . . . does not 
import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all 
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”83  
Colgrove also interprets Hardin’s commentary on the “tragedy of the 
commons” phenomenon as a “critique of libertarian philosophy . . . 
[which] suggest[s] an ethical foundation for the acceptability of coercive 
measures to ensure the common welfare.”84 Hardin contradicts this 
interpretation of himself, stating in his commentary, “The only kind of 
coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the 
majority of the people affected.”85 There emerges a paradox here of 
whether the situation of a “tragedy of the commons” necessitates coercion 
to ensure the common welfare and whether mutual coercion can ever be 
obtained in this context.  
Notwithstanding its valid claims of bodily integrity and a right to 
personhood, libertarian arguments against vaccination, taken to their 
logical conclusion, are often weakened by a potential “tragedy-of-the-
commons” state of being or by a resistance to the “free rider” situation by 
those willing to be vaccinated.  
D. How Social Contract Theory Justifies Vaccination and Public Health 
Interventions  
In consideration of the above three philosophies—social contract 
theory under Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau; utilitarianism under Mills; 
and libertarianism—advocates of vaccination and mandatory vaccine 
policy situate their arguments within the first two while anti-vaccination-
ists couch their arguments in libertarian philosophies.  
 
 
 81. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Paul E.M. Fine & Jacqueline A. Clarkson, Individual 
versus Public Priorities in the Determination of Optimal Vaccination Policies, 124 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 
1012, 1013 (1986)).  
 82. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1247 (1968). Hardin, in his 
famous essay, demonstrated how independent and rational actions by individuals acting in their own 
self-interest lead to the depletion of a shared resource contrary to the group’s long-term best interests.  
 83. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
 84. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 4.  
 85. Hardin, supra note 82, at 1247. 
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According to social contract theory, vaccination is in the best interest 
of the whole society or community. While the wealthy and healthy 
arguably may not seem to need public assistance or the community to be 
healthy because they can afford good health, the non-discriminatory nature 
of epidemics and infectious diseases means that a social contract of 
vaccination is in everybody’s interest.  
In addition, compulsory vaccination upholds social contract theory and 
protects society from disease owing to the concept of herd immunity, as 
discussed above. In lieu of one hundred percent of a population being 
vaccinated, only 80–95% must be vaccinated to protect the entire 
population. This protects those who are not able to receive vaccinations 
due to a weakened immune system (e.g., the elderly, immune-deficient 
people, and people with contraindications to vaccines) from those who can 
but refuse or choose not to. Each vaccinated member of the community 
assumes the risk of infection by undergoing vaccination in order to protect 
himself and the community from infection.  
This is the social contract theory according to Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau: the giving up of one’s natural right—to be free of disease and 
infection, or to refuse or choose not to be vaccinated—in the interest of the 
greater good. The sacrifice of one's right to be free of disease thus 
minimizes the whole community's susceptibility to contagion, granting the 
community security from disease and infection.  
Individuals cannot be independently healthy in the presence of 
infectious diseases or epidemics. Due to the “negative” and unapparent 
benefit of vaccines because its success is indicated by an absence of 
disease, its usefulness is often hard to appreciate. Colgrove asserts that 
“the invocation of a certain number of illnesses or deaths that did not 
occur has much less rhetorical force when placed against numbers of 
vaccine adverse events.”86 
Justice Harlan’s opinion in Jacobson v. Massachusetts was grounded in 
social contract theory and utilitarianism to vindicate the police power of 
the state.
87
 He writes, “[I]t [is] a fundamental principle that persons and 
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to 
 
 
 86. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 8. 
 87. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26–27 (Justice Harlan writes, “Society based on the rule that each 
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all 
could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person 
to use his own . . . person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.”).  
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secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.”88 Justice 
Harlan supports this with a quote from a previous case:  
The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such 
reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority 
of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and 
morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all 
rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s own will. 
It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the 
equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is then liberty 
regulated by law.
89
  
In consideration of the above arguments, it is apparent that the social 
contract theory as a basis for vaccination and mandatory vaccination 
policy is strongly upheld by the healthy benefit derived from living in a 
society where not only you are healthy but other individuals are equally 
healthy and disease-free and consequently unable to spread infection.  
III. THE VACCINATION DEBATE  
The vaccination debate in the United States is well known for its 
acrimonious tenor. Both sides of the debate paint a less than tasteful 
portrait of the other and each rarely sees or is ready to acknowledge the 
valid points of the other. The fact that vaccination touches an individual’s 
body and is akin to battery and invasion of bodily integrity ups the ante for 
those resistant to it, who cry foul at their apparent deprivation of the right 
to self-determination and autonomy regarding their own bodies. The 
corresponding reality that the right to autonomy over one’s body may 
negatively affect not only that one person but the community, and 
hundreds or thousands of people for that matter, is the bone of contention 
for pro-vaccinists.  
A. The Anti-Vaccination Movement  
It is generally acknowledged that the United States has “a strong 
cultural ethos antagonistic to paternalism.”90 The unique characteristic and 
nature of vaccines—administered through the introduction of a harmful 
substance into an otherwise healthy body—from other forms of medical 
 
 
 88. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 89. Id. at 26–27 (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)). 
 90. COLGROVE, supra note 1, at 4. 
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treatment, has resulted in anti-vaccinists’ disbelief in its safety and 
efficacy, religious objections, philosophical objections, state coercion 
concerns, and libertarian objections to government control. 
Anti-vaccinists argue that vaccines, like any other medical treatment, 
carry the risk of side effects or adverse reactions, and when performed on 
otherwise healthy people, subjects them to disease. In vaccination, though, 
several risks factor into making the decision whether to be vaccinated or 
not, among them “the risk of contracting the disease a vaccine is designed 
to prevent; the risk of suffering an adverse event caused by the 
vaccination; and the risk an individual may impose on others by remaining 
without protection.”91 
Risk is an inevitable part of ancient and modern medicine. In addition, 
current vaccines are safer than in the past and those vaccinated are far less 
likely to fall ill from the vaccine. Indeed, today, “the vast majority of side 
effects are transient and superficial, including pain and swelling at the 
injection site or moderately elevated fever,”92 making this argument a 
weak one.  
The cases of the Hepatitis B and the human papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccine mandates provide a rich study in coercion, public health 
federalism, and vaccine efficacy.
93
 The anti-vaccine movement strongly 
opposed both mandates, losing out in the former vaccine but winning in 
the latter case.
94
 
In the former case, Hepatitis B was spread through unprotected sex or 
intravenous drug use. In the early 1980s, the cases of Hepatitis B increased 
a hundredfold (from 200,000 to 300,000 instances) each year.
95
 As a 
sexually transmitted disease, Hepatitis B was contagious but not airborne 
like previous infectious disease epidemics. Prevention could be achieved 
by precautionary and safe behavior as opposed to vaccination alone, and as 
such, the vaccine was not “medically necessary” but “practically 
necessary” for those who did not alter their behavior.96 As a result, states 
did not rush to mandate the vaccine, and the ACIP “recommended 
vaccination only for high-risk individuals—‘drug users or [those who] 
have multiple sex partners (more than one partner/6 months).’”97 But these 
 
 
 91. Id. at 5. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Note, supra note 46, at 1828–32. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See WILLIAM MURASKIN, THE WAR AGAINST HEPATITIS B 5–6 (1995). 
 96. Note, supra note 46, at 1828.  
 97. Id. at 1829 (quoting Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Hepatitis B Virus: A 
Comprehensive Strategy for Eliminating Transmission in the United States Through Universal 
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high-risk individuals were those most unlikely to accept vaccination or 
change their sexual behavior.  
When this procedure failed to work, the CDC changed tactics and 
mandated Hepatitis B vaccination for all school-aged children, leading to 
an outcry in the form of a flood of litigation in various states across the 
United States.
98
 The plaintiffs in Le Page, McCarthy, and Boone argued 
the archaicness and inapplicability of Jacobson and Zucht in the face of 
the current Hepatitis B vaccine concerns, but the Court asserted that “[i]t is 
the responsibility of this Court, however, until the Supreme Court says 
otherwise, to give effect to immunization cases like Jacobson and 
Zucht.”99 The judgments of these two seminal cases were affirmed, and the 
anti-vaccinists realized that in order to prevail in subsequent cases, they 
would have to “take [their] fight to the legislatures”100 and not the 
judiciary, to bring about some change.  
In the subsequent HPV case, anti-vaccinists did exactly that. The FDA 
approved Gardasil, manufactured by Merck, in 2006 as the first vaccine 
developed to prevent the transmission of HPV. HPV is a sexually 
transmitted disease and as such, mandatory vaccination programs were 
targeted at school-age girls in their pre-teen years. It was estimated that by 
2007, at least twenty-four states and D.C. introduced legislation to 
specifically mandate the HPV vaccine for school.
101
 California and 
Maryland were the only states that withdrew their proposed bills.  
The difference between HPV and Hepatitis B was that HPV was 
preventable without the use of a vaccine. Abstinence and the regular use of 
condoms were among the best practices to effectively prevent 
transmission. But studies showed that barring abstinence, at almost one 
hundred percent effectiveness for certain strains of HPV, Gardasil was the 
best shot at preventing transmission of HPV.
102
 The caveat to its touted 
 
 
Childhood Vaccination: Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP), 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS & REPS., Nov. 22, 1991, at 1, 13, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00033405.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 
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 98. See In re Le Page, 18 P.3d 1177 (Wyo. 2001); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945 
(W.D. Ark. 2002); Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002).  
 99. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 956.  
 100. Note, supra note 46, at 1832.  
 101. Benjamin Lemke, Note, Why Mandatory Vaccination of Males Against HPV is 
Unconstitutional: Offering a New Approach to an Old Problem, 19 PUB. INT. L.J. 261, 261–62 (2010). 
 102. Id. at 271–72. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., P06-77, FDA LICENSES NEW VACCINE 
FOR PREVENTION OF CERVICAL CANCER AND OTHER DISEASES IN FEMALES CAUSED BY HUMAN 
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htm) (last visted Mar. 19, 2015).  
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effectiveness that prompted policy debate was the still relatively unknown 
long-term effects and safety of the Gardasil vaccine.  
In Texas, Governor Rick Perry issued an executive order mandating the 
vaccine, but this was ultimately overturned by vote by the Texas 
legislature. This stopped several vaccine mandate bills in their tracks in 
several states across the country. The anti-vaccinists had proven their 
assumption right—if they wanted to change vaccine policy, they had to do 
so through the legislature and not through the courts. Changes in the 
landscape of public health and in how public health activities were being 
regulated by federal government agencies confirmed this.  
B. Changes in the Landscape of Public Health and Vaccine Regulation 
Many commentators argue for revised vaccine policies based on 
advances in medicine, shifting burdens of disease from infectious to 
chronic diseases, and an evolution in the roles of federal and state 
governments vis-a-vis public health interventions. According to one 
insightful review, “Jacobson . . . addressed issues about medicine, disease, 
and society that are no longer relevant today.”103 The determination of the 
relevancy of Jacobson, however, depends on how the landscape of public 
health and regulation of this field has evolved with medicine and society. 
Mariner et al. advocate that  
the legitimacy of compulsory vaccination programs depends on 
both scientific factors and constitutional limits [like] the prevalence, 
incidence, and severity of the contagious disease; the mode of 
transmission; the safety and effectiveness of any vaccine in 
preventing transmission; . . . the nature of any available treatment[; 
and] . . . protection against unjustified bodily intrusions, such as 
forcible vaccination of individuals at risk for adverse reactions, 
physical restraints and unreasonable penalties for refusal.
104
  
The evolution is stark in terms of medical advances. In 1900, only one 
vaccine was commonly used in the United States; by 2006, “there [were] 
more than two dozen vaccines in use, fourteen of which [were] universally 
recommended for children.”105 At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
infectious disease epidemics killed populations by the millions; by the late 
twentieth century, smallpox was eradicated. Subsequent vaccines greatly 
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reduced the death rate from many airborne and childhood diseases like 
poliomyelitis, tuberculosis, and measles, the vast majority of which no 
longer exist in the United States.  
In the past, “levels of coverage [of vaccination] among youth have 
topped 90 percent for most vaccines, and as a result, almost all of the 
conditions they protect against have declined to the vanishing point in the 
United States.”106 Most airborne diseases susceptible to epidemics have 
been reduced largely due to vaccination in the twentieth century. In 
addition, modern medicine and scientific advances now offer more 
precautionary options besides vaccination for non-airborne, highly 
contagious diseases (e.g., disease screening and safe sex). “Scientific 
advances have produced an array of health care facilities, drugs, vaccines, 
and technologies to prevent and treat health problems.”107  
Lemke notes that “[a]s time passes, the diseases being vaccinated 
against look less and less like smallpox.”108 The nature of diseases and 
epidemics has certainly changed from the advent of vaccines to present 
day America. It has been noted that Jacobson was decided at a time when 
infectious diseases were the leading cause of death.
109
 In contrast, the main 
causes of death today are chronic diseases, and the major sources of 
infectious disease outbreaks are overseas travel, acts of bioterrorism, or 
laboratory accidents.
110
  
In 2006 the mandatory vaccine list included vaccines for diphtheria, 
tetanus, and acellular pertussis (DTaP); Hepatitis B; Hepatitis A; polio; 
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR); varicella or chicken pox; influenza; 
rotavirus; haemophilus Influenza B (HiB); and pneumococcus.
111
 Many of 
these diseases bear very little resemblance to smallpox in terms of 
contagiousness or non-behavioral transmission modes.  
The nature of diseases for which modern day vaccines exist or are 
being developed in the pipeline, like HPV, Hepatitis B, and HIV, are 
“qualitatively different from their predecessors in that they are not 
medically essential to preventing the spread of disease.”112 They are 
behaviorally transmitted and not airborne (with some like SARS being the 
 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Mariner et al., supra note 4, at 582. 
 108. Lemke, supra note 101, at 266.  
 109. Mariner et al., supra note 4, at 582. 
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exception as still airborne). Some have suggested that vaccine law must 
distinguish between vaccines that are “medically necessary” (for which a 
vaccine is the only line of defense against an epidemic) and those that are 
“practically necessary” (for which alternative lines of defense exist but are 
not being used in practice).
113
  
The case of the HPV vaccine mandate narrated above provides insight 
into how these changes are affecting public health regulation of 
vaccination. HPV, the most common sexually transmitted disease, is 
implicated in over 99% of cervical cancer cases in the United States.
114
 In 
2006, Merck’s Gardasil was FDA-approved as a vaccine for uninfected 
women.
115
 In 2008, Virginia was the only state to pass a mandatory 
student vaccination statute, complete with numerous opt-out provisions. In 
2007, Texas governor Rick Perry issued an executive order mandating the 
vaccine for school enrollment.
116
 The strong public outcry led the Texas 
legislature to overturn the executive order by statute.
117
 
This sea change has also been evident in terms of regulatory oversight. 
Mariner notes that “Jacobson was decided . . . when . . . public health 
programs were organized primarily at the state and community levels 
[and] [t]he federal government had comparatively little involvement in 
health matters.”118 The FDA did not exist until 1906, the USPHS did not 
exist until 1944, and the CDC was formed in 1946 as the Communicable 
Diseases Center.  
Responsibility for public health—regulating the safety of the 
workplace, air, water, food, and drugs—has changed hands from those of 
local city and state officials to that of the national federal government. 
Federal agencies such as the CDC and the ACIP are now responsible for 
setting the agenda for public health interventions and issuing 
recommendations regarding vaccination policy to state legislatures. 
 
 
 113. Id. at 1821.  
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C. Case Law Indications of Limits to State Power in Public Health  
Though the role of the federal government in public health has 
expanded, as described above, states’ corresponding police powers have 
not decreased by virtue of this expansion. Rather, states’ powers have been 
limited over the years by Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing and 
emphasizing the constitutional importance of individual liberties in the 
face of state police powers.
119
  
A portentous example of this change began with Wong Wai v. 
Williamson.
120
 The Wong Wai vaccination case was tried in federal courts 
but did not make it to the Supreme Court. The City of San Francisco 
Board of Health had enacted a resolution prohibiting Chinese residents 
from traveling outside the city without proof of immunization against the 
bubonic plague.
121
 The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by the law in singling out Chinese 
residents.
122
  
The Circuit Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that 
“municipal government should be clothed with sufficient authority to deal 
with [unexpected emergencies affecting the public health] in a prompt and 
effective manner.”123 Lest it go to an extreme with this holding, the court 
concurrently recognized limits to this power and a necessity for judicial 
review in certain instances. The court stated, “when the municipal 
authority has neglected to provide suitable rules . . . and the officers are 
left to adopt such methods as they may deem proper for the occasion, their 
acts are open to judicial review”124 into a potential abuse of individual 
constitutional rights. 
 
 
 119. See id. (arguing that the conceptions of state power and personal liberty established in 
Jacobson were effectively expanded, superseded, and ignored by subsequent 20th century cases). 
Sunstein agrees in postulating that Jacobson was a “narrow and shallow decision—narrow because it is 
not intended to apply to a broad range of legislation, and shallow because it does not explicitly rely on 
a general theory of constitutional interpretation to justify its result,” hence its short-lived status in 
constitutional jurisprudence. Id. at 583 (referencing CR SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)).  
 120. Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1900).  
 121. Id. at 3. The resolution first required all Chinese residents to be vaccinated against the 
bubonic plague, and additionally made it illegal for them to travel without the required documentation.  
 122. Id. at 8. Though approximately 350,000 people lived in San Francisco at the time, the City’s 
resolution applied only to its Chinese inhabitants, which made the law disproportionately affect this 
population and raised questions of discrimination. Id. at 6. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. The Circuit Court ascertained that the actions of the City’s Board of Health could not be 
justified because they were “boldly directed against the Asiatic or Mongolian race as a class, without 
regard to the previous condition, habits, exposure to disease, or residence of the individual.” Id. at 7. 
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At the turn of the 20th century, as seen in Jacobson, the Supreme Court 
subsumed and subordinated individual rights to the greater good.
125
 The 
famous holding that “the police power of a State must be held to embrace, 
at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative 
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety”126 still 
resounds centuries afterward. The Court left the means and manner of 
protecting the public health and safety to the discretion of the state, subject 
only to the limitation that the means did not contradict the Constitution nor 
infringe any right guaranteed by it.
127
  
But the Court did not end without a note of caution curbing the 
seemingly broad discretion given to states, as though hearkening back to 
Wong Wai: “The police power of a State . . . may be exerted in such 
circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular 
cases as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and 
oppression.”128  
More recently, though, modern Supreme Court constitutional 
jurisprudence has seemingly tended toward recognition and protection of 
individual and civil rights and limitation of states’ sovereign power. 
Where the rights at stake are more “fundamental,” the Court has applied a 
“strict scrutiny” test.129 Horowitz defines a fundamental right as “one that 
the Court deems so important that the government cannot infringe upon it 
without meeting the heightened scrutiny standard.”130 These are, according 
to the Court in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, “those rare cases in which 
the personal interests at issue have been deemed ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’”131 
The Court has recognized that certain aspects of constitutionally-
protected liberty, such as the freedom from arbitrary detention and bodily 
intrusion are “more important than others, such as freedom to use property 
or money.”132 The same personal interests are at stake in vaccination 
 
 
 125. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26–27. Justice Harlan writes, “[T]he liberty secured by the 
Constitution . . . does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all 
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is 
necessarily subject for the common good.” Id. at 26. 
 126. Id. at 25. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 38. 
 129. Ben Horowitz, A Shot in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to Jacobson v. Massachusetts 
Means for Mandatory Vaccinations During a Public Health Emergency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1715, 1722 
(2011). 
 130. Id. at 1724.  
 131. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 537 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(citing Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).  
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mandates. Vaccination limits some aspects of personal liberties “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty” to which Justice Stewart referred. Strict 
scrutiny requires both a “compelling” purpose that justifies this public 
health intrusion and that the intrusion be “narrowly tailored” not to 
interfere with individual liberties.
133
 The compelling reason for such an 
intrusion and limitation is the ultimate safety and protection of the public 
from disease. Where there are less “fundamental” rights at stake, the Court 
has required that the intrusion on civil liberties be “rationally related” to a 
“legitimate state interest.”134 States must meet a higher level of 
justification in order to be allowed to limit personal liberty in vaccine 
mandates.
135
 But even where there have been rights that may be classified 
as less than "fundamental,” the Supreme Court has required a higher level 
of justification from the state for limiting personal liberty.
136
  
CONCLUSION  
More than one hundred years after Jacobson, modern public health and 
constitutional law are not what they used to be. In view of the changing 
landscape and evolution of medical advances, it is evident that the 
contours of the social contract with regard to public health laws, especially 
vaccine mandate laws, need to be redrawn and revised. There is little 
controversy on this point among commentators and the debate centers 
more on the constitutionality of mandates.
137
 Issues to be considered in 
redrawing the contours of the social contract in relation to vaccines 
include medical advances and technology, the re-emergence of infectious 
diseases like measles and tuberculosis due to antibiotic resistance, federal 
jurisdiction over national security, and the nature of the epidemic.  
As seen from the discussion above, the role of government agencies 
(both state and federal) in public health, especially with regard to vaccines, 
has been significantly reduced to a suggestive one. Federal vaccine 
 
 
144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (freedom from deprivation of property); Zinermon v. Burch, 474 U.S. 327 
(1990) (freedom from arbitrary detention and physical restraint); and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578 (2003) (right to liberty within a personal relationship)). 
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 134. Id. 
 135. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. Here, the Court upheld the law because it had “a real and 
substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the public safety.” Id. at 31. 
 136. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
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 137. See Note, supra note 46, at 1821 (arguing for a revision of vaccine mandates based on 
“practical necessity” and “medical necessity”); Lemke, supra note 101, at 261 (arguing that the 
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of the public” in the words of Justice Harlan in Jacobson). 
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agencies may only suggest policies that state legislatures may choose to 
apply. Secondly, the existence of vaccines of “practical necessity” (where 
people can protect themselves from contagion via behavioral changes) and 
those of “medical necessity” (where there is an epidemic or public health 
emergency and communities cannot protect themselves without 
vaccination) suggest that mandates cannot apply indiscriminately to all 
vaccines.  
For emerging infectious diseases such as the H1N1 virus, voluntary 
isolation and vaccination may be necessary, though in the most recent 
epidemic, there was no need to compel vaccination. For infectious 
diseases such as HPV and Hepatitis B, a behavioral line of defense may be 
most effective.  
Furthermore, recent controversies over vaccine mandates such as the 
Hepatitis B and HPV vaccine have been fought not in the courts (courts 
have clearly stayed away from the issue) but in individual state 
legislatures. Even Congress to a large extent has stayed away from vaccine 
mandates, leaving the decision to state legislatures to handle. Hearkening 
back to Locke and Hobbes, since the decision to be governed is a social 
contract, it presumes a voluntary and active abdication of power by the 
people to the whole in the interest of the whole. This suggests quite clearly 
that redrawing vaccination laws and mandates is a job not for the 
executive or judiciary but for the legislature, the people.  
The history of the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence 
demonstrates the continually evolving contours of the social contract in 
the context of a real public health concern, vaccination. The Court has 
moved away from a position where states have complete power and broad 
discretion, guided by the boundaries of the Constitution, to mandate and 
implement policies with the goal of protecting the people’s health, to one 
where states’ powers are not absolute but are what the people grant to it, 
echoing Hobbes and Locke’s theories of the social contract. 
The balancing of civil liberties against the public’s interest in good 
health and a society safe from disease or contagion is a delicate one. In a 
society where individual members have ceded their individual rights to the 
collective for the good of the collective, there is a strong argument for zero 
reserved rights to the individual where individual choice would jeopardize 
the health, safety, and overall well-being of the community.  
However, in practice and considering the realities of the modern 
political community, as Mayor Wynne seemed to recognize in the Charles 
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Hoppe case,
138
 individual rights are nevertheless still sacrosanct and 
jealously guarded not only by individuals themselves but also by the 
collective governance (i.e., the legislature and the judiciary). The people 
still retain the power to self-govern via the legislature through the ballot 
box, as previously seen where executive decisions were overturned with 
legislative ones. The cases of the Hepatitis B and HPV vaccine mandates 
are testimony to this. Moving forward, redrawing the boundaries of power 
between individuals and the collective state as it pertains to vaccine 
mandates and vaccine policy would have to be a carefully crafted joint 
effort between “the people” and “the collective” to ensure that the health 
of the people is the supreme law. 
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